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THE FERNAND R. CORCOS
INTERNATIONAL LAW AWARD ESSAY*
RE-EVALUATION OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM IN
THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE SOFTWOOD

LUMBER DISPUTE
James Graham**
INTRODUCTION
THE SoFTwooD LUMBER DISPUTE BETWEEN the United States and

Canada has arguably exposed the possibility for failure of the dispute
resolution mechanism provided in Articles 18 & 19 of the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (FTA).' These articles in the FTA provide the
rules for arbitration designed to quickly and definitively resolve trade
* Before earning his law and doctoral degrees, Fernand Corcos worked as a
journalist in Paris. Corcos earned his law degree and a Doctorat es Sciences
Economiques et Politiques from the University of Paris. He was the author of numerous
works, including bestsellers on public speaking and the French political process that
were translated into many languages. His career as an attorney and human rights
activist spanned five decades and included a personal and professional association with
Jean Jauras, the great French socialist leader, and an unsuccessful candidacy for the
French national legislature. His participation as an early member of the Ligue des
Droits de I'Homme, an organization comparable to the American Civil Liberties Union,
eventually led to his elevation to membership on the Central Committee. During World
War 11, he carried out a diplomatic mission to Mexico, an opportunity which allowed
him to take French Jews out of the country on his diplomatic passport. At the war's
end, he returned to France and was one of the few attorneys willing to undertake the
defense of Pierre Laval, the Prime Minister of Vichy France. He died in Paris in 1959.
The Mus6e des Sciences de l'Homme (Paris) named its library the Biblioth~que Fernand
Corcos in his honor.
Fernand Corcos loved the law, young people, and justice, and to honor his
memory, this award for the best student paper in the area of international and
comparative law was established by his nephews and great-niece.
** B.A., Hiram College, 1988; M.A., University of Michigan, 1990; J.D., Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, 1995; and member of the Ohio Bar. The
author wishes to thank Hiram Chodosh, Associate Professor of Law, for his advice and
guidance while drafting this article and the Corcos family for establishing the Fernand
R. Corcos Award.
' Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 LL.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter
FrA].
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disputes between the two states. However, challenges to the finality of the
arbitral decisions based on accusations of bias and lack of jurisdiction and
the protracted length of the proceedings have frustrated many of the
benefits the dispute resolution provisions in the FTA sought to supply.'
This unsatisfying outcome for both states could serve as a destructive
precedent for future international trade disputes that are to be settled
under the provisions of NAFTA3 unless adequate explanations or corrective changes are made to this form of arbitration. Explanations of the
problems associated with this dispute may focus on the expected discomfort associated with a major readjustment of power from national to
supra-national agencies, the political influence of the continuing fight of
protectionist and open-market interests in the United States and Canada,
and the influence of the "adversarial" system of dispute resolution in both
nations. The foregoing problems prompt a reevaluation of the choice of
arbitration, to the exclusion of other forms of dispute resolution. With
such an evaluation in mind, recommendations for corrective changes
include creating a permanent transnational adjudicatory body, with more
basis for accountable authority and greater certainty of uniform application and enforcement of the NAFTA, disallowing dissenting voices in the
arbitral opinion and thus requiring consensus among the members, and
narrowing or better defining the justifications for challenges to arbitral
decisions. This guidance could help to stem the damage that the Softwood
Lumber dispute has inflicted on the prospects of freer trade in North
America.
I. THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND ITS ARBITRATION
REGIME

Designing mechanisms for freer trade between the United States and
Canada is not a recent phenomenon. The history of negotiated trade
liberalization between the United States and Canada extends back 140
2

There have been two previous challenges to the finality of panel decisions under

the FTA that resorted to the same mechanism for reviewing panel decisions followed
in the Softwood Lumber dispute review by an Extraordinary Challenge Committee
(ECG). They were Live Swine from Canada, ECG-93-1904-01-USA and In the Matter
of Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, ECG-91-1904-01-USA. See In the
Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Productsfrom Canada, Panel No. ECG-94-1904-01USA, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at 15-16 [hereinafter Softwood Lumber-ECG Review].
' For the most part, these provisions parallel verbatim those included in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexico, Canada, and the United
States. Future disputes between the United States and Canada will be resolved under
the provisions of NAFTA because the Canada-U.S. FTA was suspended upon the
implementation of NAFTA. R. Edward Ishmael, Jr., North American Free Trade
Agreement: Dispute Resolution Procedures, 2 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 455, 455 (1991).
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years.4 In the recent past, the United States has relied on "lobbying-based
cooperation" between Congress and the Administration to create and

regulate the law governing international trade.5 Two agencies in the U.S.

Department of Commerce are designed to implement the international
trade regulations promulgated by the U.S. Congress. They are the Interna-

tional Trade Commission (ITC), which investigates, among other things,

U.S. industry allegations of unfair foreign trade practices based on

subsidized imports; and the International Trade Administration (ITA),
which is designed to further investigate such trade-distorting foreign subsides and set custom duties to counter those practices.6
Canada is especially interested in an open U.S. market because

seventy-five percent of its exports go to that market, compared to twenty-

five percent of U.S. exports which go to the Canadian market.7 However,
the pre-FrA mechanisms for resolving trade disputes between the two
countries did not eliminate problems of continued protectionism that especially plagued the U.S. trade-dependent Canadians. Many of the allegations of unfair trade practices were decided by the "quasi-judicial" U.S.
Trade Administration system, much to the dissatisfaction of the Canadian
government and exporters.8 Allegations of protectionist policies of the
U.S. Department of Commerce agencies thus provided the impetus for

4 "Contractually regulated free trade between Canada and the U.S. began with the
Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, which the U.S. unilaterally terminated in 1866." Avraham
J. Azrieli, Dispute Resolution Under Chapter 18 of the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, 1 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 419, 420 (1990). What followed were periodic swings between protectionist and free trade policies between the two countries.
Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
and Trade Agreement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979)).
" Anne Swardson, U.S.-Canada Trade Ties Often Tenuous; A Long List of Disputes
Have Arisen Since Nations' 1989 Pact, WASH. PosT, Apr. 2, 1993, at B6 ("The United
States and Canada enjoy what both nations agree is a prosperous union: their $200
billion trading relationship is the largest in the world").
I Azrieli, supra note 4, at 420 ("As the largest trading partner of the United
States, Canada is well acquainted with the protectionist framework of U.S. trade law.
Betwden 1980 and mid-1987, American producers brought at least twenty antidumping
investigations and eleven countervailing duty cases against exporters, and the ITC was
asked to rule on thirteen safeguard cases"). In 1985, Canadian Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney recommended that the two countries negotiate a liberalized trade agreement.
He actively pursued "a comprehensive free trade agreement, often known as a free
trade zone. A free trade zone arrangement would allow the unfettered movement of
goods and services without establishing unified administrative machinery, except for a
mechanism to settle disputes." Douglas Martin, Canada Seeking Pact With U.S. on
Freer Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1985, at Al.
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Canada's insistence on a more neutral dispute resolution mechanism in
any free trade agreement with the United States.9
The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, after being signed
and ratified by both countries in 1987-88, came into effect January 1,
1989."0 The FTA was designed to eliminate protectionist trade barriers
between the United States and Canada." However, the FTA shows interest in both protecting and freeing trade between the two nations. 2 It
reduced or did away with numerous tariffs or taxes levied on goods when
they enter either foreign market, but left in place mechanisms whereby
one nation may challenge subsidies, dumping, and predatory price that
they consider unfair to international trade. 3
The most important mechanism in the FTA for promoting binational
administration of the free trade regime is found in "Part Six: Institutional
Provisions," which contains the framework for dispute resolution under
the FTA.' 4 This dispute resolution mechanism consists of two basic
components described in Chapters 18 and 19. Chapter 18 applies to disputes arising from U.S. or Canadian actual or proposed legislation or
9 Id.
"0 See United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-49, § 101(b), 102 Stat. 1851, 1852 (1988) (stating that the FTA
would come into force when the Canadian legislature enacted implementing legislation);
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, R.S.C. ch. 65, § 8
(1988) (Can.) (approving and implementing the FTA).
" "The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically in its provisions, are to:
a) eliminate barriers to trade in goods and services between territories of the Parties;
b) facilitate conditions of fair competition within the free-trade area;
d) establish effective procedures for the joint administration of this Agreement and the
resolution of disputes; and
e) lay the foundation for further bilateral and multilateral cooperation to expand and
enhance the benefits of this Agreement."
FTA, supra note 1, at art. 102, 27 I.L.M. at 293.
12 "The Governments of the United States of America and the Government of
Canada, resolved:
To create an expanded and secure market for goods and services in their territories;
To adopt clear and mutually advantageous rules governing their trade;
To reduce government-created distortions while preserving the Parties' flexibility to
safeguard the public welfare
have agreed as follows
Id. pmbl., 27 I.L.M. at 293.
13 Swardson, supra note 7, at B6.
14 FTA, supra note 1, 27 I.L.M. at 383.
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regulatory measures that are allegedly inconsistent with the application or
interpretation of the FTA provisions. 5 The parties alleging the violation
must first notify the other party, whereupon informal consultation between
the parties may take place to resolve the dispute. The provisions of
Chapter 18 created a permanent Canada/U.S. Trade Commission that is
meant to act as a neutral referee if the parties are unable to resolve their
disputes within thirty days.' Likewise, the Commission has thirty days
to help the parties resolve the dispute before it is sent to a binational
arbitral panel for final resolution. 7
Chapter 19 applies to disputes arising from findings by U.S. or
Canadian administrative authorities on dumping, subsidization, and consequential injury that are allegedly inconsistent with the application or
interpretation of the FTA provisions.' 8 The procedure for resolution of
disputes is similar to that found in Chapter 18; if the parties are unable
to voluntarily settle their dispute, it moves to mandatory dispute resolution by a binational arbitral panel. The panels are composed of three
panelists of one nationality and two of the other. 9 As of 1993, there had
been over thirty cases resolved by the binational panels under Chapters 18
and 19 of the FrA.' °
Ad hoc, binational arbitral panels to resolve disputes are commonly
chosen to avoid the lethargy of national judicial systems, alleviate problems of national bias associated with national courts, and encourage final
decisions that are binding on the states involved. The pre-FTA procedure
for resolving Canadian complaints of unfair trade practices relied on the
Court of International Trade and allowed subsequent appeals in federal
court' This stalled resolution of earlier trade disputes because of problems with overcrowded dockets in the United States. Arbitration, as
defined under Chapters 18 and 19 of the FTA, arguably was designed to
counter the problems of the earlier dispute settlement procedure.
First, the provisions of the FTA were fashioned to speed along
proceedings of U.S-Canadian trade dispute resolution. The dispute resolution mechanism under the FTA follows a strict schedule that in theory is
designed to resolve disputes in 315 daysY' Because the panels are select"S See L. Yves Fortier, The Law and Economics of Dispute Resolution in the Canada-United States Context: The Canadian Perspective, 17 CAN.-U.S. LI. 231, 240

(1991).
16 Id.
17

Id.
18 Id.
'9 Id. at 240-41.
Swardson, supra note 7, at B6.
23 See Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 8.
" FrA, supra note 1, at art. 1904.14, 27 I.L.M. at 389 ("The rules shall be
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ed ad hoc, based on the existence of a dispute, there is no problem with
backlog. Finally, selection of the panel members by the parties allows the
members to be selected based on their specific knowledge of the area of
dispute or on their expertise in dispute resolution proceedings which can
also speed things along by ensuring the arbitrators are prepared for the
subject matter of the dispute.
In order to limit the national bias that may be associated with the
decision of a national agency, the FTA provides that the adjudicatory
body selected to resolve U.S.-Canadian trade disputes must be international or collegiate in nature.' The procedure of parties selecting equal
numbers of arbitral panel members who then choose the final member
makes arbitral tribunals collegiate and in this case, international.
In addition, decisions of the arbitral panels were designed to be
generally final and un-appealable.24 Review of the arbitral panels' decisions by the arbitral panels are narrowly limited in scope.' Thus, both
countries have explicitly agreed to abide by decisions of the binational
panels under the provisions of the FTA.
II. THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER DIsPuTE
The dispute over Canadian export of softwood lumber to the United
States has been building for many years.' Before negotiations began

designed to result in final decisions within 315 days of the date on which a request for
a panel is made .... ).
' See id. Annex 1901.2, 27 I.L.M. at 393.
24 Id. at art. 1904.9, 27 I.L.M. at 388 ('The decision of a panel under
this Article
shall be binding on the Parties with respect to the particular matter between the Parties
that is before the panel.").
25 See id. at art. 1904.13, 27 I.L.M. at 388-89. §1904.13 of the FTA states:
Where, within a reasonable time after the panel decision is issued, a Party alleges that
a)
i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a serious con
filet of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of conduct,
ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or,
iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority, or jurisdiction set forth in
this Article, and
b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affected the panel's
decision and threatens the integrity of the binational panel review process,
that Party may avail itself of the extraordinary challenge procedure set out in Annex
1904.13.
Id.
26 See K. Noble, An Industry at War, TORONTO GLOBE & MAiL, Nov. 16, 1991,
at B18 (quoting the former Minister of International Trade, Patricia Carney, who stated
that the Softwood Lumber dispute is "the longest and messiest trade war Canada and
the United States have ever had").
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between the two countries, softwood lumber exports were already viewed

as one of the major stumbling blocks to a free trade zoneY In 1982, a
group of U.S. lumber producers unsuccessfully brought allegations before
the U.S. ITA that charged Canada with unfair subsidies on softwood

lumber and recommended a sixty-five percent countervailing duty.8

However, in a similar challenge in 1986, the IrA reversed its earlier
decision, finding that the Canadian softwood lumber industry was subsidized by the Canadian government and set the preliminary amount for

countervailing duties on Canadian imports at fifteen percent. 29 On the
day that the ITA was to promulgate its final determination of the amount

of duties to impose, the two countries entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) in which Canada imposed an export duty on its

softwood lumber in exchange for the United States not imposing a
countervailing import duty?0
In the 1988 Free Trade Agreement, softwood lumber was excepted
from tariff reductions because of the existing MOU." However, Canada
lifted the export duties on softwood lumber in 1991 because of a new
Canadian analysis using U.S. Forest Service standards that indicated that
the Canadian government did not provide a subsidy of softwood lumber
harvested on Provincial land.32 Canada also hoped that rescinding the
MOU would cause the Softwood Lumber dispute to be exempted no
longer from the binding arbitration provisions of the FrA 3
In response to Canada's action, the ITA issued a final determination
on May 15, 1992 that stated that the Canadian Government was improp-

' Martin, supra note 8, at Al ("The biggest stumbling block for the United States
could be lumber. The American industry contends that Canadians subsidize the cost of
trees, thereby gaining an unfair advantage. Over the last 10 years, the Canadian share
of the American softwood lumber market has grown to 34%, from 18%").
' Peter A. Piliounis, Anatomy of a Trade Dispute: The Question of Softwood
Lumber, 1 DALHoUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 72-75 (1992).

' Id. at 74-77. The allegations of unfair subsidies causing injury to the U.S.
softwood lumber industry were brought to the attention of the ITA by the Coalition for
Fair Lumber Imports. U.S. Ruling Against Canada Wood, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1986,
at D17.
' Piliounis, supra note 28, at 77-78. The imposition of an export tax allowed
Canada to retain the proceeds of the tax, but also subjected the Canadian government
to the dictates of the U.S. lumber industry. Id.
"' FrA, supra note 1, at art. 2009, 27 I.L.M. at 397 ("The Parties agree that this
Agreement does not impair or prejudice the exercise of any rights or enforcement measures arising out of the Memorandum of Understanding on Softwood Lumber of December 30, 1986").
32 Piliounis, supra note 28, at 78.
31 Id. at 78-79.
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erly subsidizing its softwood lumber industry.' The ITA recommended
that permanent countervailing duties of 6.51% be placed on the imports
of Canadian lumber. 3' The agency cited two sorts of Canadian subsidies:
charging below-market prices for trees cut on province-owned lands
resulted in a subsidy of 2.91%; and British Columbia's ban on exporting
raw logs from public land, forcing loggers to sell to local Canadian mills,
resulted in a subsidy of 3.6%.36 Soon after the ITA's final ruling, the
United States agreed that the Softwood Lumber dispute should be resolved
under the mechanisms provided for in the FTA,37 and thus a binational
panel as provided for in Chapter 19 of the FTA convened on July 29,
1992."8
The first decision by the binational panel was handed down on May
6, 1993."' The panel unanimously remanded the finding of a subsidy

•' See Steven Greenhouse, Duties Set On Canadian Lumber, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
1992, at A37. The ruling was unusual in that the United States had not waited for a
formal complaint from the U.S. lumber industry before beginning the countervailing
duty investigation. Piliounis, supra note 28, at 79.
The United States statutory law under which the ITA made its determination is
found in the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, at 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) which states:
(a) If(1) the administering authority determines that (A) a country under the Agreement, or
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such a country, or a corporation, association, or other organization organized in such a country is providing, directly or
indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or
export of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for
importation, into the United States, and
(2) the Commission determines that (A) an industry in the United States (i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury,
(B) then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in
addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net subsidy.
3 Greenhouse, supra note 34, at A37. (noting that the Canadians had feared duties
as high as 14.48% based on a preliminary finding in March, 1992 by the Commerce
Department).
3 Id.
3' See Keith Bradsher, Trade Panel Approves Canada-Lumber Duty, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 1992, at Dl.
"' Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 10.
31 See Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, Panel No. USA-92-1904-02, United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, 1993 FTAPD LEXIS 3,
May 6, 1993 [hereinafter Softwood Lumber-Binational Panel I]. See also Clyde H.
Farnsworth, Canada Wins Victory on Its Lumber Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1993, at
A37.
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back to the ITA to rework their figures and back them up with evidence.' However, in its answer to the panel, the ITA simply repeated its

earlier arguments and refused to change its conclusions. The panel issued
a second decision on December 17, 1993, in which the panel split three
to two, with three Canadians making up the majority and two Americans
dissenting." The majority concluded that the ITA's determination did not
follow the law and was unsupported by evidence, and thus, countervailing

tariffs could not be maintained against Canadian softwood lumber imports.42

In 1993-94, the United States requested that an Extraordinary Challenge Commission (ECG) be called to review the decision of the fivemember panel.43 Grounds for the challenge were conflict of interest of
the Canadian members and lack of authority for their decision.' On

Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 10. The panel remanded the
findings of the ITA in three areas: 1) the discreet nature of the group or industry
alleged to be receiving the subsidy; 2) the distorting effect of the government pricing
policy on natural resources, and 3) although the majority of the panel found that the
ITA did have the authority to impose countervailing tariffs based on the effects of
British Columbia's log export restrictions (LERs) which prohibit raw timber exportation
in order to increase reliance on British Columbia processing facilities, the panel
requested the ITA to provide empirical evidence on the distorting effect of LERs.
The panel found that Commerce is required, as a matter of law, to consider all relevant
evidence in determining whether the actual recipients of a particular programme are a
"specific group of industries" and cannot base its decision solely on evidence of the
number of industries represented by the programme recipients ....
That relevant
evidence includes the four elements set forth in the proposed regulations which
Commerce itself has proclaimed, namely, government action, number of users, dominant
or disproportionate use, and government discretion ....
The matter was remanded to
Commerce for an express evaluation and weighing of all four factors. Id.
The panel concluded that it was necessary under U.S. law to consider whether or not
the alleged advantage from the stumpage scheme did, in fact, distort the market so as
to give a competitive advantage to the lumber producers and remanded the matter to
Commerce for such consideration.
Id. at 11.
"' See In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, Panel No.
USA-92-1904-01, United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review,
1993 FA LEXIS 15, Dec. 17, 1993 [hereinafter Softwood Lumber-Binational Panel II].
42 Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 16.
3 See U.S. Reaction Typical, CALGARY HERALD, Apr. 11, 1994, at A4. See FTA,
supra note 1, § 1904.13, 27 I.L.M. at 388-89, for the grounds for review of binational
panel decisions by an ECG.
' See generally Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2. The challenge based
on the binational panel exceeding its power stemmed from allegations that the majority
did not apply the appropriate standard of review to the determination of a U.S. agency.
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August 3, 1994, the three-member ECG determined in another split
decision that the grounds for the challenge were unfounded; two Canadians formed the majority and one American dissented.'
It is not yet apparent whether the United States will accept the
decision of the ECG.' The International Trade Commission has the
ability to reevaluate their finding of subsidy and then begin the dispute

all over again.47 There is also talk of a constitutional challenge to the

validity of panel proceedings.'

The United States alleged that applying a higher standard of review than had been
previously applied in U.S. Appeals courts in similar circumstances caused the panel to
substitute its judgment for that of the U.S. agency. The FTA provides in Article 1904.3
that the panel "shall apply the standard of review described in Article 1911 and the
general principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise would apply to a
review of a determination of the competent investigating authority." Id.
For further discussion of the allegations and the opinions of the ECG members,
see infra parts IV. A & B.
The challenge based on conflict of interest stemmed from allegations that two of
the Canadian panelists violated the FTA Code of Conduct by failing to disclose what
the United States might view as interests or relationships "that are likely to affect the
candidate's independence or impartiality or might reasonably create the appearance of
bias." Id.
For further discussion of the allegations and the opinions of the ECG members,
see infra part IV. C.
' See generally Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2. For a description of
the majority and dissenting positions on the issues, see infra parts IV. A-C.
4
Canada Must Fight With All Its Weapons, CALGARY HERALD, Aug. 6, 1994, at
A4. ("After this week's final ruling in favor of Canada by a bi-national extraordinary
[challenge] committee under the Free Trade Agreement, forest products companies and
lumber state congressmen pledged to fight again. Unfortunately, FTA rules allow them
to raise the issue again and restart the whole process").
47 Id.
' Softwood Fight Renewed, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 15, 1994, at E2 ("The U.S.
Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports says it's going back to court over the issue of
Canadian softwood lumber exports. Spokesman Gus Kuehne says the group filed papers
Wednesday with the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. He says the coalition
wants to challenge the constitutionality of the dispute-settlement mechanism of the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. He says he believes the mechanism is illegal because it grants a foreign government control over American laws"). See also Catherine
Harris, Canada Vulnerable To Rise of U.S. Protectionism, FIN. PosT, Oct. 1, 1994, at
22 ("The committee charged with dealing with the softwood lumber dispute has
continually come down on Canada's side, but to little avail. The Americans see the
committee as biased and there is now talk of taking it to court on the grounds that
one of the Canadian members recently joined a law firm that had acted for some forest
product companies").
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PROBLEMS ILLUMINATED BY THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER DISPUTE

The dispute resolution mechanism contained in the FTA and now
NAFTA has lost a degree of credibility because the Softwood Lumber
dispute's protracted proceedings have frustrated many of the benefits the
dispute resolution provisions in the FTA sought to supply. Even if the
United States and Canada were to end the dispute at this point, it has
already been smoldering for more than a decade, with the time lapse
between the first claim directed to the binational panel and the decision
of the ECG consuming three years4 The proceedings have demonstrated
that the FTA has failed to remove the influences of national bias from
the dispute resolution mechanism. Although the arbitral panel was international in its constitution, it appears that the nationality of the final
arbitrator may have created a national majority capable of defeating the
collegiate character of the panel: theoretically, a majority could arrive at
a decision without the input of the other arbitrators. This leads to the
question of whether the decision of the arbitral tribunal can be characterized as final and binding. Certainly the decision of the five-member
arbitral panel that published a decision in 1993 was not final. Moreover,
the decision of the ECG may not be binding because of the possibility of
a renewed finding by the ITC thus resulting in a subsequent dispute."
The lack of a quick resolution of the Softwood Lumber dispute, the split
of panelists along national lines, and the continued challenge of the
panel's decision have all gone against the benefits envisioned for arbitration under the FTA.
During the last several decades, arbitration has been promoted as a
means of resolving both private and public international disputes. Perhaps
people have chosen arbitration as the favored international trade dispute
mechanism without evaluating its relevance and effectiveness in given
situations. The unresolved nature of the Softwood Lumber dispute indicates that it is time to reevaluate the way the system currently works and
how it could be improved through change. Unless adequate explanations
or corrective changes are made to this form of arbitration, the
unsatisfying outcome for all parties involved could serve as a destructive
precedent for other public and private parties using arbitration to settle
international trade disputes.

' See Anne Swardson & Peter Behr, From Beer to Boards, Trade Disputes Grow:
U.S. and Canada Are Having Trouble Over Compliance With Agreements, WASH. POST,
Apr. 12, 1994, at C1.
o Canada Must Fight With All Its Weapons, supra note 46, at A4.
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A. Failure to Eliminate National Bias

Under the former system of adjudication of trade disputes, non-U.S.
states dissatisfied with findings by the ITC could take their claims to the
U.S. Court of International Trade.51 Decisions of this court could be appealed to federal court. 2 The level of review was low; the appeals
courts afforded
the agency a great deal of deference in making their
53
findings.
Under the FTA mechanism for resolving U.S.-Canadian trade disputes, in which binational panels selected by the disputant states review
the findings of the ITC or the parallel Canadian agency, the level of
review is not clearly delineated. Article 1904.3 of the FTA provides that
the level of review and the general legal principals applied by a binational panel should parallel those applied by a domestic court.5 4 The definition of the standard of review is found in Article 1911, 55 which indicates
that the appropriate standard of review for U.S. antidumping and countervailing duties is found in the Tariff Act of 1930.56
Interpretation of this U.S. standard of review is the crux of the
s' Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 9.
Id.
See Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 168 ("[Wlhen there is a gap
in the statute, it is the agency, not a reviewing court, which is authorized by Congress
to fill it").
4 FTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904.3, I.L.M. at 387 ("The panel shall apply the
standard of review described in article 1911 and the general legal principles that a
court of an importing Party otherwise would apply to the review of a determination of
the competent investigating authority").
" FTA, supra note 1, at art. 1911, 27 I.L.M. at 393. Standard of review means the
following standards, as may be amended from time to time by a Party:
a) in the case of Canada, the grounds set forth in section 28(1) of the Federal Court
Act with respect to all final determinations; and
b) in the case of the United States of America,
i) the standard set forth in section 516A (b)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended, with the exception of a determination referred to in (ii), and
ii) the standard set forth in section 516A (b)(1)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended, with respect to a determination by the United States International Trade
Commission not to initiate a review pursuant to section 751(b) of the TariffAct of
1930, as amended.
Id.
Section 1516a(b)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, sets forth the
standard of review for the Court of International Trade, and now for the binational
panels. It states that "the court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding or
conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 19 U.S.C. §1516a(b)(1)(B) (1988).
52
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disagreement between the Canadian members and the American member
of the ECG in the Softwood Lumber dispute. The Canadian members of
the ECG reasoned that the binational panel was instituted to eliminate or

reduce the amount of allowable national bias in liberalized international
trade.Y If the level of review were to remain at the same low level,
there would be no need for the binational panel.5 8 The ECG majority

found that the binational panel's determination reasonably could have
been made by a U.S. appellate court 9 Contrasting the position of the
majority, the dissenting opinion stressed that the level of review of Com-

merce Department determinations should remain exactly as it had under
the Court of International Trade.' In his dissent, Mr. Wilkey states
implicitly that if the review had been before an appellate court, the court
would have shown deference to the Commerce Department's determination.61
The dissent's criticism of the Canadian members of both the ECG
and the binational panel is that they do not understand how to apply U.S.

domestic law, specifically the standard of review of a government agency.
This argument may have some merit because the Canadians serving as
panelists are called on an ad hoe basis and are not specifically required
' Cf. FTA, supra note 1, at art. 102, 27 LL.M. at 293. One of the stated objectives of the FTA is to "establish effective procedures for the joint administration of this
Agreement and the resolution of disputes." Id. See also Softwood Lumber-ECG Review,
supra note 2, at 43 ('When the parties to the FTA agreed to replace [the Court of
International Trade] with this type of panel, they must have realized and intended that
a review of the actions of Commerce or the Canadian agency would be more intense").
58 Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 81.
Id. at 42 ("Because this is a case of first impression, I cannot say that an appellate court in the United States could not reach the same conclusion as the unanimous
panel of May 1993 and the majority panel of December 1993. The arguments made on
both sides had a solid foundation in court precedents and the amount of deference
extended to the agency was in tune with the novelty of the exercise").
6 Id. at 135 C"mhe United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement was sold to the
Congress and to the Parliament by its sponsors in both countries on the representation
that the domestic law, substantive and procedural, would continue to apply unchanged . . . and that, particularly, the standard of judicial review would be maintained
by the two tier [Panel and ECG] appellate substitute for the domestic courts of each

country").
6 Id. at 175 ("Confronted with a comparatively new economic situation to be
addressed, it is the ITA of the Commerce Department-not the courts (or the substitute
Panel)-to whom Congress has given discretion to formulate policy and methodology
Unless the Panel majority or my two colleagues
adequate to the circumstance ....
[on the ECG] can show that Commerce acted contrary to a specific provision of the
governing statute, and neither has even pretended to assert this, Commerce's Redetermination must prevail").

486

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 28:473

to have knowledge of U.S. domestic law.62 However, the majority's
argument that a binational panel cannot be expected to act exactly in the
same manner as a domestic court is persuasive. If there is to be no
difference in the outcome of reviewing anti-dumping and countervailing
duties, the complex procedure of forming a binational panel is unnecessary. The merits of the arguments of both sides demonstrate that the FTA
dispute resolution mechanism does not clearly eliminate national bias by

means of an ad hoc binational panel.
B. Political Influence
In the case of the Softwood Lumber Dispute, it cannot be said that
U.S. international trade law and the Canada-U.S. FTA is applied without
political influence.63 For example, in the United States, strong political
pressure derives from the backing of private interests pushing for the
countervailing tariffs.'M Since 1983, the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports has petitioned and pushed the ITC to implement such a tariff.' Its
1986 petition to ITC caused the Commerce Department to issue a preliminary affimnative countervailing duty determination, in spite of the fact
that Canadian stumpage practices had not changed since the previous
challenge.' In a highly unusual move, the United States did not require
a formal complaint from the American lumber industry before starting its
investigation of Canadian softwood lumber imports in 1991.67 After the
See FTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.2, 27 I.L.M. at 393, and Annex 1904.13.1,
27 1.L.M. at 395 (citing the limited requirements of those serving on binational panels
and ECG).
' See Swardson & Behr, supra note 49, at C1 ("Both the methods of dealing with
[the Softwood Lumber Dispute] and the goal post seem to be constantly moving,"
Canadian Agriculture Minister Ralph Goodale said in a telephone interview. 'The
62

process has become so protracted and politicized .... It's absolutely remarkable that

this would be happening within two or three months of NAFTA coming into effect").
SStuart Auerbach & Bill Claiborne, U.S. Finds Canadian Lumber Subsidized;
Preliminary Commerce Decision Raises Angry Protests From Ottawa, WASH. POST,

Mar. 7, 1992, at A14 (noting political pressure from lawmakers from the Pacific
Northwest and the lumber industry); Canada Must Fight With All Its Weapons, supra

note 46, at A4. See also Harris, supra note 48, at 22 ("U.S. politicians are also threatening to block the enabling legislation to implement the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. Most analysts feel that this is political posturing, especially since Sen. Robert Dole, one of the main protagonists, is well-known as a free trader and was strongly
behind the GATT negotiations").
See also Softwood Fight Renewed, supra note 48, at E2.

Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 82 (This resulted in the
implementation of Canadian export duties as agreed upon in the MOU).
67 Piliounis, supra note 28, at 79.
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final decision by the binational panel in 1993, only the governments, not
other participants in the panel proceedings (e.g., the Coalition for Fair
Lumber Imports), were permitted to request an Extraordinary Challenge.
However, the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports called for such a challenge immediately after the decision was issued, galvanizing the position
that the U.S. Department of Commerce soon adopted as its own.68 The
Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports remained as a non-party participant
during the ECG Review. 69 This is but one of many private interests
applying political pressure to the system.
The FrA and NAFMA are especially susceptible to political pressures
because of their recent adoption and ratification. In the United States,
political polarization on the issue of trade liberalization is ongoing, in
spite of the fact that the agreements were made and ratified in the United

States by the legislature." As the majority states, the binational panel
and subsequent ECG decisions are cases of "first instance"' and thus
are prone to greater debate over how they interpret the law governing this

new mechanism for international dispute resolution. 2 A similar polariza-

tion places pressure on the Canadian position in the Softwood Lumber
Dispute: scathing newspaper articles from Canada indicate that similar
political problems exist on the Canadian side. 3 The influence of this

's Even before the Commerce Department made any statement on the decision by
the five-member binational panel, the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports publicly stated
that the panel had "exceeded its authority" and "substituted its judgment for that of the
responsible U.S. agency." Farnsworth, supra note 39, at A37.
This was the same position that the Commerce Department soon adopted as their
own in making the Extraordinary Challenge. See Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra
note 2, at 17-18.
See generally Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2.
o Auerback & Claiborne, supra note 64, at A14. After the ITA's decision to
impose a countervailing tariff on Canadian softwood lumber, Derek H. Burney,
Canada's envoy to the United States, characterized the decision as "a tortured attempt
to manipulate the facts to substantiate a preordained result" and said it would cast an
"unwelcomed cloud" over the negotiation of NAFTA. Id.
7'Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 61.
n U.S. lawmakers and members of the judiciary who continue to favor the past
practice of protectionism are likely to urge a narrow reading of the powers and
limitations placed on such binational panels and those favoring trade liberalization are
likely to urge a broader reading of the applicable law.
3 See Ken McQueen, Forget About Quebec, Worry About the U.S., CALGARY HERALD, May 4, 1994, at A4 ("[Firee trade deals are [no longer] adequate armor against
the increasingly parochial, protectionist and downright flaky, U.S. Congress. Recent
assaults on Canadian durum wheat and softwood lumber serve as expensive illustrations
of its shallow, slap-dash agenda"); U.S. Reaction Typical, supra note 43, at A4
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skeptical portion of the Canadian population has caused some in the
government to press more emphatically for restraints on the ability of the

United States to bully its weaker trade partners, while others suffer the
embarrassment of having negotiated a system that appears at times to be

a little more favorable to Canadian interests than the previous dispute

resolution mechanism.74 An example of the how these political pressures
have manifested themselves in the actual opinions of the ECG can be
found by looking at the divergent views on the role of the five-member
binational panel compared to the former mechanism for resolving trade
disputes with the United States, that is, the Court of International
Trade.75
C. Influence of the Adversarial System
The role of arbitrators as "neutral" parties, in spite of the fact that
they are appointed by states and are expected to protect the best interests
of their respective states, is problematic. Arbitrators are not simply
advocates for their country's position, but are sworn to promote freer

("Maybe someday the world will be just the way the United States wants it, but not
in the lifetime of anyone negotiating with American trade wranglers. Free Trade Agreement or no Free Trade Agreement, Canada may as well get used to petty tit-for-tat disputes and occasional full-scale trade wars"); Canada Must Fight With All Its Weapons,
supra note 46, at A4 ("Americans never lose. Sometimes the time runs out when their
opponent is ahead, but the game never ends until they declare victory").
See Piliounis, supra note 28, at 83 ("[Softwood Lumber's] importance to provincial and state economies guarantees that those affected will try to gain every
competitive advantage possible. Because of this problem, it seems unlikely that there
will be a negotiated comprehensive settlement of this dispute in the near future and
potentially unpredictable trade laws will continue to be the method of choice").
' Following the aggressive liberalization stance more commonly found in Canada,
Mr. Hart states that he "would like to point out that in reality the replacement of court
adjudication by a five-member panel of experts in international trade law may very
well reduce the amount of deference to the [Commerce] Department in the future . . .
• When the parties to the FTA agreed to replace [the Court of International Trade]
with this type of panel, they must have realized and intended that a review of the
actions of Commerce or of the Canadian agency would be more intense." Softwood
Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 42-43.
In contrast, Mr. Wilkey's position represents the tight protectionism of the United
States. He states that "[the binational panel and ECG] are the complete and only
substitute for the U.S. appellate system. If this substitute appellate system had not been
intended to achieve similar resultsin applying U.S. law, the United States would have
never agreed to it. The United States never contemplated that U.S. law would be
changed by a binational body. If the substitute appellate system does not achieve
similar results in applying U.S. law, it may not be long continued." Id. at 138.
14
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trade by applying the law as adopted by agreement between the coun-

tries.7 6 Indeed, ECG panel members are selected from a roster of judges

or former judges of a federal court of the United States or a court of a
superior jurisdiction of Canada
In spite of this attempt to foster neutrality, the fact that the binational panel opinion and the ECG opinion in the Softwood Lumber Dispute

split along nationality lines may, at first blush, cast doubt on the neutrali-

ty of the arbitrators.78 Perhaps this indicates that the law is not as impor-

tant as having a majority sitting on the panel.79 Selection of the final
member from the roster of one Party or the other may limit credibility
with the other Party's members and inhibit the ability to broker a compromise between both Parties' panels." This analysis necessarily takes
into account that there are at least two "reasonable" ways to read the law
governing the dispute, and that national preferences will be the deciding

factor in resolution of such a dispute." When violations of the tenets of
" In the provisions for establishment of the binational panel, the FTA states that
"[c]andidates shall be of good character, high standing and repute, and shall be chosen
strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment, and general familiarity
with international trade law. Candidates shall not be affiliated with either Party, and in
no event shall a candidate take instructions from either Party." FTA, supra note 1,
Annex 1901.2.1, 27 I.L.M. at 393.
Id. Annex 1904.13.1, 27 LL.M. at 395.
See generally Softwood Lumber-Binational Panel I, supra note 39; Softwood
Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2.
In Malcolm Wilkey's dissent in Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, although he does
not actually allege that his Canadian colleagues on the ECG and the Canadian members
of the binational panel are of questionable neutrality, the implication of such allegations
is present in the tone of his opinion. He states,
I do not think that any Canadian members of this or previous ECG's have arrived with
any particular animosity against the U.S. Commerce Department, and I certainly do not
suggest in the slightest any bad faith on the part of my Canadian colleagues-indeed,
they have been most assiduous in striving to understand and discuss rationally U.S. lawbut it is a fact that out of six votes cast on the three ECG Committees, not one of the
Canadian votes has been in support of a United States Commerce Department decision
I put this down not to any prejudice on the part of the Canadian members, but,
....
I suggest, based on my analysis above and particularly the Panel's dissent by the two
Americans in this particular case, simply to the lack of understanding of the principles
of judicial review of administrative agency action under United States law.
Id. at 210-11.
" See Azrieli, supra note 4, at 430 ('The unequal representation that results might
also create hostility, derived from contentions of partiality, and the appearance of
unfairness in the arbitration procedure").
g Id.
", There have been dozens of disputes settled under the provisions of Chapters 18
and 19 of the FTA, but thus far only three have been reviewed by an Extraordinary
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FTA or NAFTA are clear, there is less likelihood of a divided opinion.'
Based on the long history of the Softwood Lumber Dispute, changes in
policies by U.S. and Canadian agencies over that period of time, and the
inability of the FTA dispute resolution mechanism to quickly and definitively resolve this dispute, it is apparent that there is more than one way
to reasonably interpret the applicable law.83
However, the Softwood Lumber Dispute also demonstrates that the
United States will not accept a "reasonable" reading of the law when it
loses and when it believes that national preferences influenced the resolution of the dispute. In the past, the United States did not have to deal

with influences of national preference because the "neutral" adjudicatory
body was American. Representatives of the disputant parties acted as
advocates, rather than judges, so the influence of national preference did
not provide a basis on which to challenge the decision-an advocate's job
is to advocate preference, national or otherwise. However, in the case of
the Softwood Lumber Dispute, one of the grounds of challenging the
decision was conflict of interest of two of the Canadian binational panel
members.84 It appears that the United States views those members sitting
Challenge Committee. See Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 20. Review
by an ECG is only allowable for systemic problems such as violation of the rules of
conduct, violation of rules of procedure, or the panel exceeding its power. FTA, supra
note 1, at art. 1904.12(a), 27 I.L.M. at 388-89. Thus a "reasonable" reading of the
governing law, in spite of unavoidable influences of national preferences, stands unless
systemic problems can be shown.
' See Fortier, supra note 15, at 241. ("More than a dozen reviews have been
requested by Canadian and American businesses [between 1989 and 1991], and the fear
that these panels might split along national lines has not materialized. Most of the
panel decisions challenging United States rulings have been unanimous").
8 See supra part III.
No less contentious than what standard of review to apply to a U.S. agency
determination were the allegations of conflict of interest on the part of two Canadian
panel members. The two were accused by the United States of violating the F1TA rules
of conduct by failing to fully disclose, both before and during the arbitral proceedings,
contractual relations with the Canadian government and several of industrial interests
backing the Canadian position on the U.S. Commerce Department tariffs. The governing
principle of the FTA rules of conduct is that a candidate or panel member must
disclose the existence of any interests or relationships that are likely to affect the
candidate's or panel member's independence and impartiality or that might reasonably
create the appearance of bias. Existence of such interests or relationships is grounds for
a candidate's pre-emption or a member's dismissal. See Softwood Lumber-ECG Review,
supra note 2, at 66.
In the majority opinion, Mr. Hart contends that the two panel members in question
did fully and in good faith disclose all interests or relationships pertinent to their
service on the panel. He states that the allegations raised by the United States focused
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on the arbitral panel more like advocates than neutral judges.
IV.

PROPOSITION FOR SYSTEMIC CHANGES

Systematic changes to the dispute resolution mechanism in FTA and
NAFMA should reflect the problems illuminated by the Softwood Lumber
Dispute. In spite of the fact that this is the first dispute to remain so
unsettled after complete proceedings of the FTA dispute resolution
mechanism, many disputes having been settled quickly and with finality
under the same mechanism, some in the United States are calling the
Softwood Lumber Dispute a failure of the FTA dispute resolution mechanism and taking the position that this single failure is sufficient to call
for the end of the use of this mechanism.'5 Thus the Softwood Lumber
Dispute's significance may be far-reaching and require systemic changes
to the FTA/NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism in order to ensure its
future. Recommendations for change focus on the problems of national
preferences, political influences, and adversarial system influence.
A. Creation of a More Permanent Court to Reduce National Bias
In order to curb the discomfort associated with a readjustment of
power from a national agency or adjudicatory body, the parties to FTA
and NAFTA should consider creating a more permanent court to manage
trade dispute resolutions. An example of such a system can be found in
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of International
Arbitration.' Designed to settle business disputes of an international
character through arbitration, the ICC Court of International Arbitration
manifests a unique combination of ad hoe and institutional elements that
facilitate its success in resolving international business disputes with
neutrality and effectiveness.' Under the rules of the ICC Court of Inter-

on matters which had no connection whatsoever with the work of the panel and would

not have risen to the level to justify dismissal of either panelist. See id. at 69-79.
In the dissenting opinion, Mr. Wilkey contends that the "simple and undeniable
facts" are that the United States did not receive full disclosure from the Canadian
panelists and regardless of whether such disclosure would have caused dismissal of the
said panelists, not disclosing such information violated the rights of the United States
under the FTA and is grounds for vacating the decision in which the panelists
participated. See id. at 223-31.
' See Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 205-06 (Wilkey's dissenting
opinion).
8 See generally W. LAURENCE CRAIG Er AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBrrRATION (2d ed. 1990).
' See Yves Derains, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, 5 PACE L.
REv. 591, 597 (1985).
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national Arbitration, the parties to a dispute are able to choose their own
arbitrators who will hear and resolve the dispute, but all proceedings and
final awards are overseen by a permanent court of judges (the Court),
selected on a rotating basis by the members of the ICC.8 Under Article
26 of the ICC Rules, the Court has a duty to "make every effort to make
sure the award is enforceable at law." 9 It does not correct alleged errors
of fact or law, but simply acts to ensure the sufficiency of the award and
to avoid procedural defects.' Such a system works to ensure the accountability of the arbitrators and a uniform application of procedural
rules by a body that is by design more neutral than the arbitrators
themselves. Its success can be seen in the member's confidence in the
neutrality of ICC awards and their willingness to enforce such awards.9'
The creation of a permanent adjudicatory body under the FTA is not
completely foreign to the FrA dispute resolution mechanism. The current
system already uses a roster of possible candidates to serve as arbitrators
on both the arbitral tribunal and the ECG.' However, these candidates
must continue in their own careers as attorneys, general counsels, or judges.' These continued relationships in the commercial and public trade
arena potentially create conflicts of interest. This is especially true if the
candidates happen to be "experts" in foreign trade because they will be
in demand by many interested parties-public and private, domestic and
international.
The establishment of permanent judges who serve an intergovernmental court would avoid some of the conflict present in the current system
by making the judges more neutral.94 The justices on such a court would

CRAIG ET AL, supra note 86, at 27-33 (Duties of the permanent court include:
determination of the existence of a prima facie agreement to arbitrate; appointment of
chairpersons on arbitral panels; determination of place of arbitration, determination of
the fees and expenses of the arbitrators, approval of the arbitrators' terms of references;
deciding challenges against arbitrators; extensions of time limits; and approval of
awards).
9 Id. at 32.

9 Id.
91 Id. at 347-50.
' See FTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.2, 27 I.L.M. at 393 (stating the criteria for
the establishment of binational panels), and Annex 1904.12, 27 I.L.M. at 395 (stating
the criteria for establishment of extraordinary challenge committees).
9' See Azrieli, supra note 4, at 427-31 (indicating that it is difficult to keep
potential panelists on the roster because of their involvement in private practice,
corporate work, or the judiciary).

'9 This is not the only proposal to create a permanent bi-national or tri-national
agency in North America. See McQueen, supra note 73, at A4 ("Law professor
Armand de Mestral of McGill University . . . advocate[s] a North American parliament
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be viewed as working for an international body rather than representing
the interests of their respective state, and therefore, the system would be
less susceptible to the influences of national bias. Borrowing from the
example of the ICC Court, neutrality and effectiveness of the
FTA/NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism could be increased either
through permanent international court oversight of arbitral proceedings or
by taking the place of the ECG as a means of appeal of the arbitral
decision. Likewise, such a plan would encourage greater accountability
and uniformity because permanent judges would have to ensure that
future decisions were consistent with past decisions. In this manner the
FTA/NAFTA could mimic the policy considerations demonstrated in the
example of the ICC Court's review of arbitral awards for sufficiency and
procedural defects. Moreover, such a permanent institution would not
adversely affect the speed and efficiency of the judiciary because the
court would be devoted solely to trade disputes between the party states.
The creation of a permanent binational court (or multinational in the case
of NAFFA) would be a major step toward solving problems of national
bias that remain after the repositioning of power to a supra-national
judicial process (i.e., ad hoc international arbitration) designed to resolve
trade disputes.
B. ClearerJustificationsfor Challenges
The political influences that nullify advantages foreseen by the
creators of the F1A could be curbed by providing clearer justifications for
review of the arbitral panel decisions by Extraordinary Challenge Committees. Presently, the language in the F1A that provides for extraordinary
challenges is not clear. It contains two parts: 1) a list of specific systemic
grounds for challenge; and 2) a requirement that the systemic problem
have a material effect on the outcome of the arbitral tribunal's decision.9' The two parts are conjunctive.'
Proof of the ambiguity of current requirements for an extraordinary
challenge can be seen in the differing opinions of the majority and
dissent in the Softwood Lumber-ECG Review. The majority in the ECG
Review of the Softwood Lumber Dispute focuses on the material effect of
the systemic problem.' Gordon L.S. Hart, in his majority opinion,

to resolve cross-border economic and political problems').
' FTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904.13, 27 I.LM. at 388-89.
96 id.
9

Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 61-62 (The majority opinion is

"satisfied that there is [no systemic problem] arising out of this dispute settlement
proceeding ... as to affect the panel's decision or in such a way that the integrity of
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indicates that the ECG mechanism is designed to correct aberrant actions
of the panel that substantively affect the panel's decision." He does not
believe that the ECG provides losing parties a means of challenging panel
decisions in which systemic problems did not reach the level of adversely
influencing the panel decision." Herbert B. Morgan, in his concurring
opinion, takes a similar position, indicating that ECG proceedings are
only appropriate when systemic problems have materially affected the
panel's decision." In contrast to the position of the majority, the dissenting opinion of Malcolm Wilkey focuses on the list of specific systemic grounds for challenge.' Specific grounds for the challenge include:
failure of the binational panel to apply the proper standard of review
which resulted in the panel exceeding its authority;" 2 and violations of
the code of conduct for panelists which resulted in a serious conflict of
interest, He charges that any time members of the binational panel
fail to follow the exact mandates of the FTA, whether or not such failure
could be outcome determinative, appeal to the ECG is appropriate."4

the binational panel review process is threatened").
" Id. at 23. ("Such an experiment [as the creation of an agency to promote broader
international cooperation in trade] requires a mechanism to correct aberrant panel
behaviour when it materially affects a decision and threatens the integrity of the
binational panel process").
99Id. at 23-24 ("[T]he ECG cannot become an appeal forum for every frustrated
participant in the binational panel process").
" Id. at 93. ("In short, as the name implies and as the FTA provisions and
procedural rules suggest, the role of the Extraordinary Challenge Committee is to
review Binational Panel decisions only in exceptional circumstances and to vacate those
decisions where it is established that (a) the Panel or member thereof was guilty of the
conduct prescribed in section (1) of Article 1904.13 or the panel was in breach of
and that such actions materially affected the panel's decision and
sections (II) or =11)
threatens the integrity of the binational panel system") (emphasis added).
101 Id. at 275-77 (The dissenting opinion states, "It appears to me abundantly clear
that the Panel substituted its judgment for that of the agency when it apparently made
a choice between the conflicting views of Canadian and U.S. Parties. In doing so it is
clear to me that the Panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction set
forth in FTA art. 1904.13(a)(iii)").
02 Id. at 131-35. ("[Olur task as an ECG is to look at how the Binational Panel
did its job, i.e., carried out its review of an administrative agency action under the
standard of review prescribed in the statute, which is the equivalent of the wellunderstood standard of judicial review in effect in the United States for many years").
103 Id. at 223-25 ("It is important the there be no conflict of interest, whether actual
or perceived, on the part of any panelist") (quoting Ronald Reagan).
" Wilkey's extremely broad interpretation of the exact mandates of the FTA
agreement include prior and subsequent (i.e., negotiations for NAFTA) legislative history
of both the FTA itself and its enabling legislation. See id. at 135-58.
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Allowing for such a broad reading of permissive challenge to
binational panel decisions opens the possibility for political influence in
the system. Mr. Wilkey's dissenting opinion implies that such a challenge
can be based on application of domestic law, in addition to the systemic
grounds listed in FrA Article 1904.13.1' In the case of a challenge
based on the standard of review, this necessarily includes a reading of the
intent of Congress based on legislative history, because Article 1904.13
does not explicitly state the standard of review,"° and Mr. Wilkey proposes that such legislative history can include subsequent action by
Congress." Thus, the example of the Softwood Lumber Dispute shows
how the political influence of the lumber industry, lawmakers from the
Pacific Northwest, and other lawmakers who favor trade protection for the
United States can impact the proceedings of a binational review panel
through subsequent legislative history, etc. Not only were such interests
able to applying pressure to the ITA to take unprecedented action in
challenging the decision of the binational panel, but, in the mind of one
ECG member, they also impact the interpretation of substantive law.
In order to limit capricious political influence, the language of the
FTA should more explicitly state that if a systemic problem does not
materially alter the decision of a binational panel, then there can be no
grounds for extraordinary challenge. Such explicit grounds for review of
arbitral decisions were found to be workable in France in order to
decrease capricious challenges to international arbitral decisions by the
French courts." 8 In balancing both the need for arbitral autonomy and
useful judicial control over international arbitral awards, France promulgated a well-defined list of grounds for judicial review of such
awards."° Success of the new and explicit criterion for limited judicial
' Id. at 205-06. ('I submit that the well intentioned system of Extraordinary
Challenge Committee, as a substitute for the standard appellate review under the United
States law, has failed. It has failed both at the Panel and the Committee level to apply

United States law, substantively, and most clearly in regard to the United States

standard of review of administrative agency actions").
,o6See id. at 32.
,o Id. at 190-96.
'o'The French legal system created a sophisticated body of French case law and
scholarly commentary pertinent to the finality of arbitral decisions. However, in a civil
law system, such "common law" characteristics proved cumbersome to the litigants and
the uncertainty from implicit inclusion in the Civil Code discouraged international

arbitration in France, specifically at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). See
Thomas E. Carboneau, The Reform of the French Procedural Law on Arbitration: An
Analytical Commentary on the Decree of May 14, 1980, 4 HAsTINGs INT'L & COMP.

L. REv. 273, 276 (1981).
"

Known as the Decree of 1981, this legislation provides limited judicial oversight
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review of private international arbitral decisions is demonstrated in the
number of cases submitted to the International Chamber of Commerce
Court of Arbitration in Paris since promulgation of the new rules.11
Likewise, more explicit limitations on the challenge of binational
panel decisions in the case of FrA and NAFTA would impart more
confidence in the system to both the "winning" and "losing" parties. The
"winning" party's fear of an unfounded challenge to the binational panel's
decision would be decreased, and the "losing" party's certainty of staging
a valid challenge would be increased. In keeping with the spirit of
international cooperation found in both the FTA and NAFMA, a binational
panel should be able to make a reasonable reading of the law, and then
not have their reading challenged by the pressures of domestic political
influences.
C. No Dissenting Voices Allowed

In order to limit the influence of the adversarial system in what is
represented as a "neutral" binational adjudicatory body, the FTA should
prohibit dissenting opinions. It is inevitable that judges in any judicial
venue will have differing opinions. However, opponents of dissenting
opinions propose that the decision of a court or judicial body must be
that from the court as a whole, not that of the judges in their individual
capacity."' Such unanimity serves to strengthen the public's esteem and

of private international arbitral awards, but only to the extent necessary to assure foreign courts that they are valid awards and guarantee that parties frustrated by such
defects have a means of remedying the situation in France, if that was the site of the
original award. Article 1502 of the Decree of 1981 allows judicial review of awards:
1. If the arbitrator gave judgment in the absence of an arbitration agreement or on the
basis of a void or expired agreement.
2. If there was an irregularity in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or in the
appointment of the sole arbitrator.
3. If the arbitrator's decision does not conform to the terms of his reference.
4. When the principle of audiatur et altera pars has not been observed.
5. If the recognition or execution is contrary to public policy.

NOUvEAu CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE, art. 1502, (Fr.), reprinted in JEAN-LOUIS
DELvOLVti, ARBITRATION IN FRANCE: THE FRENCH LAW OF NATIONAL AND INTERNA-

TIONAL ARBITRATION 86 (1982) [hereinafter French Code of Civil Procedure].
...See Derains, supra note 87, at 591. More arbitrations have been requested in the
ICC Court of Arbitration in the thirteen years since the implementation of the new
French law than in the entire 56-year history of the Court. ICC CaseloadReaches 7000
Mark, INT'L FED'N OF COM. ARB. INSTITUTIONS NEWSL. (EFCAI, New York, N.Y.),
Jan. 1992, at 6.
.. IJAZ HUSSAIN, DISSENTING AND SEPARATE OPINIONS AT THE WORLD COURT 2

(1984) ("It is maintained that judges must settle their differences through discussion and
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confidence in the court."2 Permitting dissenting opinions exposes individual judges to pressures because public disclosure of individual votes

and differences of opinion may cause the judges to lose their independence by falling victim to internal and external intimidation."'

Dis-

senting opinions may also negatively impact the law, creating an impres-

sion that the law is indefinite and obscure." 4 An example of an interna-

tional dispute resolution system that, although not explicitly forbidding
dissenting opinions, follows a policy of discouraging such opinions is the
International Chamber of Commerce Court of International Arbitration in
Paris." 5 Dissenting opinions are discouraged for ICC arbitration taking

place in France because of a possible challenge under domestic French
law for violating the secrecy of deliberations of the arbitral panel mem-

bers."6 The French insistence on secrecy of deliberations is designed to
protect the privacy of the parties to the
arbitration, as well as ensuring
17
the independence of the arbitral panel.'

that losers must thus submit without ado to the majority viewpoint").
,,2Id. (citing LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RiGHTs 71-72 (1958). The author theorizes that disallowing dissenting opinions stems from the Continental or civil law legal
tradition in which the "expression of dissent conveys the impression of a divided court
which diminishes its authority ....
[Tihe primary importance given to confidence in
a court necessitates the sacrifice of such opinions." He contrasts this to the "Common
Law" legal tradition which favors dissenting opinions as an essential element in the
development of law. He states that in the "Anglo-Saxon world the survival of a court
depends on the development of law which may be achieved through individual opinions." Id. at 263.
"' Id. See also CRAIG ET AL., supra note 86, at 332-35. (The opponents of dissenting opinions argue that "dissenting opinions underscore the link between the arbitrator
and the party who nominates him [and] weaken the search for a unanimous decision").
"4 HussAIN, supra note 111, at 2 ("[The dissenting judge] conveys the impression
to the world that the law is indefinite and bad if it is not in harmony with his own
convictions"). In the Second Hague Conference of 1907, designed to reexamine the
1899 Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, participants chose
to disallow dissenting opinions in arbitral decisions. They reasoned that by "allowing
those members who remained in the minority to state their dissent and later on approve
it,the dispute which was to be buried within the confines of the tribunal would be
brought out .. . [,] reopening the debate and expos[ing] the award to the possibility
of being subjected to doubts." Id. at 15-16.
"' See generally CRAIG ET AL., supra note 86.
226 Id. at 497-98. ("For fear of imperiling the award, the ICC therefore in the past
did not communicate dissenting opinions to the parties when arbitration was conducted
in France"). Article 1469 of France's Nouveau Code de Proc&lure Civile states that
"[t]he deliberations of the arbitrators are secret." French Code of Civil Procedure, supra
note 109, art. 1469, at 73.
.. See generally Carbonneau, supra note 108, at 283-86, 288-90 (highlighting the
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The present system of dispute resolution under the FTA allows for

dissenting opinions to be created and published with majority opinions. In
the area of the law surrounding the FTA, many of the cases are of first

impression."' This "newness" creates a sense of instability in the law

that is worsened by allowing dissenting opinions." 9 Allowing dissenting
opinions provides a catalyst for polarized views of the law that further
weaken its application and enforcement. The Softwood Lumber Dispute
demonstrates this danger in both the binational panel decision and the
ECG decision.
Because this area of law continues to be in development and in need
of strengthening, it would be better to require a consensus of the arbitrators."2 Following this requirement, a binational panel would have to
find common, uniform interpretation of the law. Such decisions would
help to solidify the law.' The process of coming to consensus could
limit the panelists' tendency to act as adversaries advocating a national
position, and encourage the panel to work together as a "neutral" adjudicatory body."

innovative values of the reformed French laws).
"" Softwood Lumber-ECG Review, supra note 2, at 61 ("Everyone has agreed that
this is a case of first impression and that the law in this field is very difficult").
"'
The circumstances of the Softwood Lumber Dispute seem not to necessitate the
development of the law as much as the fortification of the authority of the dispute
resolution mechanism itself, i.e., the binational panel and the ECG. Thus the "common
law principles" of allowing dissents to encourage development of the law is less
applicable than the "civil law principles" of disallowing dissents to bolster the authority
of the court. See HussAiN, supra note 111, at 263.
" Consensus encourages the judges to settle their differences through discussion
until all members are willing to submit to the majority viewpoint. See id. at 2.
121 See id. at 263 (describing
the civil law theory of the effect of dissenting
opinions).
"z For an example of the divisive effect of dissenting opinions, one must merely
look to Mr. Wilkey's opinion in the Softwood Lumber Dispute-ECG Review. Mr.
Wilkey uses the forum of this opinion to belittle his colleagues and to deride the
current system of dispute resolution. He states, "I suggest that under the present
scheme, the five member Binational Panels are not likely to consider themselves less
'expert' in the future, and that we have no way to educate such persons on the U.S.
standards of judicial review of agency action, particularly the Canadian members. So
we are likely to continue to get a usurpation of the administrative agency function by
well intentioned experts in the field of trade law." Softwood Lumber-ECG Review,
supra note 2, at 220-21.
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CONCLUSION
The aforementioned systemic changes would alleviate problems
identified by the Softwood Lumber Dispute. However, their implications
go beyond changes to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. There are
obvious implications to NAF1A because it has superseded the CanadaU.S. FFA, and NAFTA has adopted almost verbatim the dispute resolution provisions in the Canada-U.S. FTA.
In addition, the problems identified by the Softwood Lumber Dispute
appear likely to occur universally. Other agreements, such as such as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), that propose to liberalize trade and resolve disputes in an international venue will likely suffer
from similar problems of readjusting control of dispute resolution
mechanisms from national to supra-national agencies, political influence
interfering with the application of law, and neutrality of arbitrators. It is
worth analyzing whether other agreements that have adopted arbitration as
a mechanism for dispute resolution would benefit from the same type of
systemic changes to alleviate similar problems.

